



1º FÓRUM SOBRE

LEMA:
JUNTOS PELA SEGURANÇA:
EM TERRA, NO AR E NO
CIBERESPAÇO

SEGURANÇA DA AVIAÇÃO CIVIL CONTRA ACTOS DE INTERFERÊNCIA ILÍCITA

RISK ASSESSMENT : MAIN CHALLENGES FOR STATES IN IMPLEMENTING THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

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ICAO

RECONNECTING THE WORLD



Acts of Unlawful Interference



These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation, including but not limited to:

- unlawful seizure of aircraft,
- destruction of an aircraft in service,
- hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
- forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility,
- introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes,
- use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the environment,
- communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.

USAP-CMA Objective

To improve global aviation security through auditing and continuous monitoring of the aviation security performance of Member States. The USAP-CMA assesses:

- ✈ The level of effective implementation of the critical elements of an aviation security oversight system, providing an indication of sustainability; and
- ✈ The indicative degree of compliance with Annex 17 Standards and security-related Standards of Annex 9.




USAP-CMA supports Assistance and Policy Development


- Generates up-to-date State-specific and regional data which provides useful and critical information to facilitate the provision of targeted and tailored assistance to States
- Provides valuable feedback to ICAO for the development of SARPs and guidance material




Regional Audit Results – Sustainability indicator



Regional Audit Results – Compliance with Annex 17






Regional Audit Results – Compliance with Annex 9 Security-related Standards



By Year	Percentage of States	Achieve Effective Implementation (EI) Rate
2023	90%	80%
2030	100%	90%

GASeP Aspirational Targets







ICAO

Doc 10108 — Restricted

Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement

Third Edition, 2022

RISK CONTEXT STATEMENT(RCS)

- Contains a global aviation security risk assessment, including a global threat picture
- Intended to help inform and support ICAO Member States processes for national and local aviation security risk assessment
- Appendix A: Risk Assessment methodology and process map used to conduct this global risk assessment
- Should be made available to those responsible for conducting national and other aviation security risk assessments, and aviation security decision makers, practitioners and other relevant stakeholders
- Identification of risks permit member States to determine and implement proportionate measures and controls to mitigate appropriately against each risk type



RCS Aims to:

- Offer States a methodology and a framework to conduct risk assessments at national level
- Provide an overview of the current global aviation security threat
- Present high level risk assessment to help inform States national civil aviation security programme(NCASP)
- Assist ICAO in improving and updating SARPs, guidance material to ensure they address threat and risks



REASONS WHY TERRORISTS CHOOSE/SELECT AVIATION AS A TARGET

- Inflicting mass casualties
- Causing economic disruption
- Making a symbol statement
- Influence public opinion against authorities/generating public anxiety

CYBER SECURITY

- Incidences have recently sharply increased across critical infrastructure sectors
- Member States encouraged to review and consider strengthening their cyber security programmes
- ICAO and AUC have strong cyber security programmes



THREAT TYPE-RISK LEVELS

- Person Borne IEDs on the body or in the cabin baggage- High
- IEDs in Cargo/Mail- Medium/High
- Attacks using UAS(on aviation targets in conflict zones)- Medium/high
- Landside attacks(including landside vehicle borne IEDs)- Medium/High
- Aircraft used as a weapon-Medium/High
- Chemical Threats-Medium/High
- MANPADS/Missiles/other attacks from a distance(conflict zones)-Medium /High
- IEDS in hold luggage- Medium
- IEDS in services(catering, in flight supplies)- Medium
- Cyber attacks, Conventional hijack, Biological/Radiological attacks- Medium/low



Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation

Aviation Security

Safeguarding International Civil Aviation
against Acts of Unlawful Interference

Twelfth Edition, July 2022



ANNEX 17 REQUIREMENTS ON RISK ASESMENT

3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall keep under constant review the level and nature of threat to civil aviation within its territory and airspace above it, and establish and implement policies and procedures to adjust relevant elements of its national civil aviation security programme accordingly, based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.

3.1.4 Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should ensure that periodic vulnerability assessments are conducted at its airports engaged in international operations, ensuring coordination among relevant departments, agencies, including appropriate law enforcement and intelligence authorities, and other entities. Such vulnerability assessments should be used to inform risk assessments and security improvements.*



3.1.5 Each Contracting State shall establish and implement procedures to share, as appropriate, with relevant airport operators, aircraft operators, air traffic service providers or other entities concerned, in a practical and timely manner, relevant information to assist them to conduct effective security risk assessments relating to their operations.

Note 1.— Guidance on security risk assessment can be found in the Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973) and the Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement (Doc 10108).

Note 2.— Guidance on safety risk management can be found in the Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).

Note 3.— Guidance on assessing risk over or near conflict zones can be found in the Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones (Doc 10084).



CHALLENGES FACED BY STATES IN IMPLEMENTING RISK ASSESSMENT

- Inability to fully understand the risk posture within the State/region
- Nature of the threat keep changing
- Lack of strong legislative framework/National program to support risk assessment framework
- Involvement by multiple State agencies(coordination)
- Capacity(Human resources and Financial resources)
- Technological challenges(data analysis)
- Varied State priorities /political instability



GASeP Aspirational Targets

- By 2023 : 90% of States achieve 80% EI of CEs
 - ❖ Global – 41%
 - ❖ ESAF - 18%
 - ❖ WACAF – 17%
- By 2030 : 100% of States achieved 90% EI of CEs
 - ❖ Global – 27%
 - ❖ ESAF - 5%
 - ❖ WACAF – 9%



ICAO Annex 9 – *Facilitation*



- ❑ Implementation of Annex 9 SARPs are essential:
 - ➔ To facilitate the clearance of:
 - ✓ aircraft;
 - ✓ passengers and their baggage;
 - ✓ cargo, mail and other articles.
 - ➔ To manage challenges in border controls and airport processes to maintain both the security and the efficiency of air transport operations.
 - ➔ Key issue is interagency coordination
 - ➔ Other issues – accident victims, health, unruly pax, reduced mobility, trafficking persons.

Key Concepts - ICAO TRIP Strategy



API/PNR

What is API, iAPI and PNR? How is it processed in a Passenger Data Single Window



Security Council Resolutions and Annex 9

01

UN Security Council Resolution 2178

Amendment 26 to Annex 9 – Facilitation

Obligation to establish an API system to tackle the FTF threat

02

UN Security Council Resolution 2396

Amendment 28 to Annex 9 – Facilitation

Obligation to develop a PNR processing capability to tackle terrorist offences



Advance Passenger Information (API) – What is it?

01

Information about the passenger:

- Surname / Given Names
- Nationality
- Date of Birth
- Gender
- Official Travel Document Number
- Issuing State or Organization of the Official
- Travel Document Type
- Expiration Date of Travel the Document.

02

Taken from the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) of the document used for travel:

- Flight Identification
- Scheduled Departure Date
- Scheduled Departure Time
- Scheduled Arrival Date
- Scheduled Arrival Time
- Last Place / Port of Call of Aircraft
- Place / Port of Aircraft's Initial Arrival
- Subsequent Place / Port of Call within the country
- Number of Passengers

03

With accompanying service information:

04

Transmitted to control authorities under legal requests:



Advance Passenger Information (API) – How is it used?

01

Transmitted by the carrier using electronic means to the requesting public authorities:

A batch message is usually transmitted by the aircraft operator:

- at the end of check in,
- or at flight departure,
- and sometimes both.

02

API data provides verified information about passenger's identity.

The primary value of API is the improvement in:

- facilitation,
- security and
- passenger clearance procedures in terms of efficiency, effectivity and preventing unnecessary delays.

03

API is screened against watchlists, searching for “hits” in databases thereby identifying wanted individuals or travel documents that are suspicious or associated with illegal intentions:

- Individuals wanted for arrest by law enforcement authorities
- Individuals known by law enforcement authorities for previous criminal behavior who should subject to additional checks upon entry
- Individuals travelling using documents suspected of being lost or stolen

04

With advance notice of the intended arrival of these individuals the authorities responsible for border control operations can focus limited resources where they are most need, reduce the workload of officers at the border, and enable the faster processing of legitimate travellers



Interactive API (iAPI) – How is it different?

01 **iAPI allows States to process incoming API data and scan their border control systems instantaneously and provide a response message to the aircraft operator in real-time, typically board or no-board.**

02 **API** – allows you to know who is going to arrive at your border so appropriate action can be planned **on arrival in the State**

03 **iAPI** – allows you to know who is going to arrive at your border – before they even get on the plane and take the necessary action **before they have departed to the State**

04 **ICAO Annex 9 – *Facilitation Standards and Recommended Practices relating to iAPI***

- Recommended Practice 9.16 — *Each Contracting State should consider the introduction of an interactive Advance Passenger Information (iAPI) system.*
- Recommended Practice 9.17 — *Contracting States seeking to implement an iAPI system should:*
 - a) *seek to minimize the impact on existing aircraft operator systems and technical infrastructure by consulting aircraft operators before development and implementation of an iAPI system;*
 - b) *work together with aircraft operators to develop iAPI systems that integrate into the aircraft operator's departure control interfaces; and*
 - c) *conform to the Guidelines on Advance Passenger Information (API) adopted by WCO/ICAO/IATA when requiring iAPI.*



Passenger Name Record (PNR) data – What is it?

01

Defined by ICAO Doc 9944 Guidelines on Passenger Name Record Data:

- generic name given to records created by aircraft operators or authorized agents for all the segments of a journey
- commercial data supplied by or on behalf of the passenger concerning all the flight segments of a journey
- Includes changes to requested seating, special meals and additional services requested
- captured in many ways: reservations may be created by various marketing organizations with pertinent details of the PNR then transmitted to the operating carrier(s).

02

UN Security Council Resolution 2396 and ICAO:

- *urged* “ICAO to establish a standard for the collection, use, processing and protection of PNR data.”
- Amendment 28 to Annex 9 introduced a baseline of data protection based Standards and Recommended Practices giving reassurance to States and industry alike about the global implementation of PNR systems

03

Annex 9 Standards and Recommended Practices on PNR

- Obligation to develop the capacity to collect, use, process and protection PNR data
- Compliance with international standards on PNR
- Purpose limitation safeguards
- Safeguards and redress mechanisms
- Restrictions on automated processing of PNR data
- Independent oversight
- Use of sensitive personal data
- Data retention safeguards
- Facilitation of global framework



Passenger Name Record (PNR) data – How is it used?

01

Pro-active processing:

- Processed in real time on arriving and departing flights
- Compared against watchlists and databases used for terrorism and crime purposes to identify individuals who are already known to law enforcement authorities
- Processed against sets of pre-determined rules and criteria to identify individuals previously unknown to law enforcement authorities but whom an analysis of the data suggests may be involved in terrorist or criminal activities and who should therefore be subject to further examination by the competent authorities

02

Re-active processing:

- On the basis of intelligence, historical and retained PNR data accessed on a case by case basis to help investigations by competent authorities
- Aids competent authorities in unravelling criminal networks



Passenger Data Single Window (PDSW)

01

Annex 9 Standard 9.1 - Contracting States requiring the exchange of Advance Passenger Information (API)/interactive API (iAPI) and/or Passenger Name Record (PNR) data from aircraft operators shall create a Passenger Data Single Window facility for each data category, or both data categories combined, **that allows parties involved to lodge standardized information with a common data transmission entry point** to fulfil all related passenger and crew data requirements for that jurisdiction.

02

Processing of API is of benefit to multiple agencies

- Police
- Customs
- Immigration
- Intelligence

03

An effective Passenger Data Single Window facility has a number of benefits:

- Facilitates border integrity;
- Allows various government agencies with a legal remit to access passenger data to make use of the data in an efficient manner; and
- Optimizes border clearance processes and collaboration amongst border control authorities and law enforcement agencies

04

- Air carriers should only be required to transfer API data to one government agency which acts as the Passenger Data Single Window
- Only one government agency should be responsible for carrier engagement, connectivity, relationship management and non-compliance
- Once the State receives API data through the Passenger Data Single Window it must share it with all public authorities with a legal remit to make use of the data



CHALLENGES /PROPOSED SOLUTION/IMPROVEMENTS

- LACK OF EFFECTIVE RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES
- NUMBER OF STATES WITH SIGNIFICANT SECURITY CONCERNS INCREASING
- A NUMBER OF STATES NOT TAKING INITIATIVES TO CORRECT USAP CMA/MISSION FINDINGS
- SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RELATED PROVISIONS OF ANNEX 9 FAL (API.PNR, PKD)
- AFI STATES NOT MAKING ENOUGH FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO VOLUNTARY FUNDS

WAY FORWARD :

EACH STATE TO HAVE AN ACTION PLAN MONITORED BY ICAO REGIONAL OFFICES ESAF.





Thank You